“We argue instead that educational attainment and higher income increase political dissatisfaction, such as dissatisfaction with one’s government or foreign policy, when holding all other factors constant. We also argue that politically dissatisfied men and women are more sympathetic to suicide bombings.”

Their study is based on data from the Pew Global Attitudes Project. The following question from the survey was used:

Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets [in our country] are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?

Slightly over half of the Pakistani (50.4%) respondents to the survey never consider suicide bombings of civilians justified, and, somewhat surprisingly, 60.4% think that  suicide bombings of Westerners in Iraq are never justified. When broken down according to educational attainment, the percentage of Pakistanis who believe suicide bombings are never justified against civilians are: 43.7% of Pakistanis with below primary education, 54.4% of Pakistanis with primary education, 56.6% of Pakistanis with secondary education, and 63.4% of Pakistanis with higher education. A similar negative correlation is seen between wealth and support of suicide bombing.

With respect to Pakistan, the authors conclude:

“The basic and extended models … offer no statistical evidence that educational attainment matters. The extended model provides some evidence that compared to the poorest respondents, upper-middle income respondents in Pakistan are less likely to support suicide bombing against Westerns in Iraq.”

and that,

“Respondents in Pakistan with primary education are more likely to be politically dissatisfied than those without primary education.”

Despite the lack of consistent indicators that span the Muslim public, the study concludes with two broad policy recommendations.

1. The first recommendation is to continue the expansion of ‘peace’ education. They note: “The purpose of such education would not be to reduce political grievances that can be very real but to suggest other ways to bring about change that cause less suffering and damage to society… This, however, may be too much to ask from some of the more oppressive regimes and the narrow elites that lead them.”
2. The second recommendation is somewhat less well defined: “The present dissatisfaction … can be reduced if governments of Muslim countries, U.S., and other Western states adopt policies that respect the dignity, welfare, interests, and lives of Muslims everywhere”. They recommend taking steps to reduce political dissatisfaction, such as supporting trade, economic integration, and cooperative international security.

A recent paper by Dr Asim Khwaja (Harvard) and Dr Atif Mian (U of Chicago), with graduate student Prashant Bharadwaj, is an excellent example of quantitative social science research on a locally relevant issue. Titled “The Big March: Migratory Flows After the Partition of India”, the paper analyzes archival records to answer questions about the volume of people who migrated to India or Pakistan at the time of the partition in 1947.

This is a controversial topic, to say the least. Estimates of those who died in the process vary significantly across sources, especially depending on the national or religious affiliations of the source. More importantly, there have hardly been any scientific studies of perhaps the most significant event in the history of the subcontinent.

Bharadwaj, Khwaja and Mian used the 1931 and 1951 censuses to estimate the net outflow and inflow from each district. The inflows were easily measured through the 1951 censuses in India and Pakistan, in which census responders were explicitly asked whether they were a “muhajir” (as referred to in Pakistan) or a “displaced person” (a term used in India). Computing the outflows was more complicated because that information was not readily available in the archives. However, the authors first used the 1911 and 1921 censuses to compute the growth rate of each minority (Hindu, Sikh and Muslim). They then took the numbers in 1931 census and, using the growth rates, projected them to 1951. Comparing the projected numbers and the actual census figures of 1951 resulted in an estimate of the net outflow from each district. Finally, by comparing the outflows and the inflows, they were able to estimate the number of ‘missing persons’, those presumably killed during the migration.

The results are staggering. The authors estimate a net outflow of 17.9 million people. That is 17.9 million (1 crore, 79 lakh) souls, leaving their homes and belongings, and attempting to reach a new homeland! Of these, 3.4 million never made it. This number is absolutely astounding. Consider it in the context of other events in our history. In the 1965 and 1971 wars combined, about 7000 people are estimated to have been killed. About 550 deaths are estimated in the Kargil war. The devastating earthquake of 2005 claimed more than 80,000 lives. The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami killed about 0.225 million people. Contrast that to 3.4 million souls perished! In terms of the number of people killed, the partition of India is an event of the order of magnitude of the Holocaust, in which 6 million Jews are estimated to have been killed.

The authors report some additional statistics. The total number of ‘missing people’ along the Punjab border is estimated to be 2.2 million. This includes close to 1.26 million Muslims and more than 0.84 million Hindus and Sikhs combined. As a percentage of the migrating population, about 16% of people from both groups went missing. On the Eastern side, about 1.1 million Muslims went missing, and about 0.24 million Hindus/Sikhs. Furthermore, the authors pointout that on the Punjab border, the migration was almost ‘complete’, i.e., very few Muslims were left on the eastern side and very few Hindus or Sikhs on the western side. The 3.5 million Muslims in Indian Punjab in 1931 were reduced to 0.2 million by 1951. On the Pakistan side, the drop was even more drastic: The Hindu/Sikh population reduced from 16% to a mere 0.16%.

The authors are already working on more detailed research into the demographics of the partition. At the end of their paper, they state:

This paper serves to answer the more basic question of how many moved and where. In Bharadwaj, Khwaja and Mian (2008) we study the effects of the migratory flows on overall gender ratios, literacy levels and occupation structures of India and Pakistan. In subsequent work we hope to examine the impact of these flows on outcomes like agricultural productivity, health, etc. We hope that quantifying this event of human history will encourage more empirical research related to Partition as well as forced migrations in general.

The Partition of India has, in the past, hardly been researched scientifically. It is amazing how an event of this magnitude has largely been ignored in academic discourse. Searching for writings on the topic, one comes across mostly short-stories, and little else. This is in stark contrast to the Holocaust, which has been studied in minutest detail by academics and researchers.

On a broader note, this sort of ground breaking research on social issues is direly needed. Rather than speculative, ‘drawing-room’ analysis, we need more of quantitative, evidence-based research, to understand the challenges the society is facing and to debate their solutions.

We wish this team of researchers all the best in their subsequent work.